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Cyber hygiene is a relatively new paradigm premised on the idea that organizations and
stakeholders are able to achieve additional robustness and overall cybersecurity strength
by implementing and following sound security practices. It is a preventive approach
entailing high organizational culture and education for information cybersecurity to
enhance resilience and protect sensitive data. In an attempt to achieve high resilience
of Smart Grids against negative impacts caused by different types of common, predictable
but also uncommon, unexpected, and uncertain threats and keep entities safe, the Secure
and PrivatE smArt gRid (SPEAR) Horizon 2020 project has created an organization-wide
cyber hygiene policy and developed a Cyber Hygiene Maturity assessment Framework
(CHMF). This article presents the assessment framework for evaluating Cyber Hygiene
Level (CHL) in relation to the Smart Grids. Complementary to the SPEAR Cyber Hygiene
Maturity Model (CHMM), we propose a self-assessment methodology based on a
questionnaire for Smart Grid cyber hygiene practices evaluation. The result of the
assessment can be used as a cyber-health check to define countermeasures and to
reapprove cyber hygiene rules and security standards and specifications adopted by the
Smart Grid operator organization. The proposed methodology is one example of a resilient
approach to cybersecurity. It can be applied for the assessment of the CHL of Smart Grids
operating organizations with respect to a number of recommended good practices in
cyber hygiene.
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INTRODUCTION
The growth of Smart Grids is causing a complex transformation of electricity generation and
distribution into new flexible integrated transmission and distribution systems. The idea of
innovative transformation of the power industry involves the development and implementation
of distributed, self-regulating energy systems, which include generating sources and backbone and
separate networks where all types of consumers are served by the intelligent network in real time.
Unlike traditional solutions designed to transport electricity from a generator set to end-users
through a unidirectional flow of power and a centralized control system, modern Smart Grids are
fully distributed systems that make extensive use of computer remote control and automation.
Peculiarities of the organization of intelligent distributed electricity networks pose risks associated
with their implementation, operation, and modernization. Compared to traditional power systems,
the Smart Grid merges the multiply technologies into the dynamic and interactive infrastructure,
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which provide full integration of millions of power devices and
sensors, enabling prompt bilateral energy transmission,
monitoring, and energy management through the advanced
communications system and smart meters, such as Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), directional relays (DR), and
demand-side management (DSM) (Wang and Lu, 2013). At
the same time, intensive information exchange makes the
Smart Grids vulnerable to a number of malicious threats
related to telecommunications and network systems. This
jeopardizes the reliable and safe operation and is touted as the
key objective of the Smart Grid. Intruders can lead to a number of
serious consequences in the network, which can lead to the
disclosure of private information, disruptions, power outages,
or even the destruction of infrastructure. Thus, along with other
features of the Smart Grid, cybersecurity and resilience are
becoming critical issues, as a number of electronic devices are
interconnected through information communication networks at
critical facilities that directly affect the reliability of such a vast
infrastructure. As the energy system is one of the main key public
infrastructures, damage to any component of the network can
lead to huge losses in terms of the country’s economy and social
welfare.
There are two related but different approaches for
understanding system response to changes; they are
vulnerability and resilience (Miller et al., 2010). As mentioned
by Linkov et al. (Linkov et al., 2019), “resilience as a philosophy
and methodology seeks to better prepare complex systems for a
variety of threats,” whereas “vulnerability is seen as a condition,
encompassing characteristics of exposure,... shaped by dynamic
processes and power relations...” (Blaikie et al., 1994; Downing
et al., 2005; Eakin and Luers, 2006).
According to Saed et al. (Saed et al., 2013), there are four main
classes of vulnerabilities that create significant risks and open the
possibility of various cyberattacks as follows. 1) People, policy,
and procedure, lack of necessary training and noncompliance
with policies and procedures cause numerous security risks and
issues. 2) Vulnerabilities in software and firmware: it sounds
reasonable when stakeholders need certain access permission to
the system in accordance with their technical responsibilities. The
system software and unsigned firmware are susceptible to
different types of attacks and can be compromised by hackers.
3) Platform vulnerabilities: exacerbating the problem is that each
smart device could be delivered with its own firmware; this means
that several vulnerabilities could appear on a single device. 4)
Network service vulnerabilities: particular issues associated with
system architecture and configuration can result in a situation
where the operating system and hardware have a common
network security problem. Traditionally, networks suffer from
weakness in hardware, software, or organizational processes and
involve data, software, or physical assets.
People are both a major asset and a major business
vulnerability. It is a matter of common knowledge that the top
tier attacks employ common security breaches and the success of
cyberattacks is entirely dependent on the cyber habits within the
target organizations. For example, one of the problems posed by
attacks targeting smart meters or sensors and actuators to
monitor and control some physical process is that most users
are not even aware of the computational nature of smart objects.
The awareness of the computational powers of smart objects and
even of the objects themselves disappears as they become more
pervasive and diffused (Greenland Energy Profile, 2018). With
that in mind, the training and awareness programs targeted on
good practices in cybersecurity and cyber hygiene for every Smart
Grid user (in electricity organizations or in smart home) are vital.
To reduce the chances of becoming a victim or spreading an
attack, people need to be educated about cybersecurity best
practices pertinent to domestic and professional situations and
should be able to put in force cyber hygiene rules.
Cyber hygiene (CH) is the core concept of training
organizations to be proactive about cybersecurity in order to
offset the risk of cyber threats and security issues (Norton,
2020). The Center for Internet Security (Energy statistics,
2017) defines CH as a set of baseline cybersecurity
protective activities that help implement security in an
organization. The CH is defined as a set of protection
procedures, policies, and rules to address cyber risks in
Smart Grids. This is a preventive approach to security. We
devise the cyber hygiene framework as recommendations and
training materials. The framework will enclose a list of
potential cyber threats in terms of confidentiality, integrity,
and data availability. The main purposes of CHMF creation are
as follows: (i) to incorporate cyber hygiene practices for utility
services and operations where they have not been used before,
e.g., personnel training, network segregation, device, and
network passwords; (ii) to enable continuous and periodic
assessment in use case scenarios such as substation operator,
smart home user, and hydropower plant; (iii) to find a broader
knowledge of how and when hygiene techniques could be
useful against common cyber threats. The CHL
measurement will reveal current cyber awareness maturity
among personnel and will allow organizations to provide a
tailored set of cyber hygiene training for users and
management. This approach should help educate the end-
users on SPEAR tools and their functions, as well as increasing




There are a set of standards related to Smart Grid CH. A good
point to computing a Cyber Hygiene Level (CHL) regarding
several cybersecurity standards includes ISO/IEC 27001 & 27002,
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 “Information technology—Security
techniques—Information security management
systems—Requirements,” and ISO/IEC 62351 “Security
Standard for TC 57 series of protocols.” Other NIST& NERC
cybersecurity references include the following: NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800-53 Rev.4 “Security and Privacy Controls
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” NIST SP
800-82 Rev.2 “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Security,” NIST SP 800-63-2 “Electronic Authentication
Guideline,” NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev.4 “Recommendation
Frontiers in Computer Science | www.frontiersin.org March 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 6143372
Skarga-Bandurova et al. Cyber Hygiene for Smart Grids
for Key Management,” NIST CAVP (2018)-Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program, NIST CMVP-Cryptographic
Module Validation Program based on FIPS 140-2 requirements,
NIST SP 800-52 Rev.1 “Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration,
and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations,”NIST
SP 800-81 Rev.2 “Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment
Guide,” NIST SP 800-77 Guide to IPSec VPNs, NIST SP 800-113
“Guide to SSL VPNs,”NIST SP 800-88 Rev.1 “Guidelines for Media
Sanitization,” and NERC CIP v5 “Critical Infrastructure Protection”
standard framework.
EU Projects and Initiatives
As mentioned in Inria White Book No. 3 (2019), there are several
EU initiatives promoting the CH path. The French Agence
Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (2013)
(ANSSI) put together the “40 Essential Measures for a Healthy
Network” in a guide for people responsible for the security of
information systems. The ENISA issued a set of CH practices
(ENISA Europa EU, 2017b, Cyber Hygiene). The ECSO developed
the “Cybersecurity Human Resources Network” aimed at
increasing awareness about various CH initiatives (ECS, 2018,
WG5). Besides, there are a number of EU initiatives that do not
focus on CH but address challenges for Smart Grid cybersecurity
and suggest high-level technological solutions. For example, there
are several EU-funded projects working on this topic as follows:
The Community Research and Development Information Service
(CORDIS, 2020) of the European Commission returns 1,018
results for the queries related to the “Smart Grid,” 239 results
for “Smart Grid security,-” and 4 results for query “cyber hygiene.”
After a detailed analysis, we summarize below the following seven
projects: SPARKS, UMBRELLA, SEGRID, SUCCESS, DRIM-GO,
SIPSEC, and PROTECTIVE.
SPARKS, Smart Grid Protection Against Cyber Attacks project
(2014–2017), https://project-sparks.eu/, provides several
innovative Smart Grid security solutions with application to
risk assessment, development of reference architectures for
secure Smart Grids, and suggestions on Smart Grid security
standards. Several novel techniques based on big data for
security analytics in Smart Grids and hardware tools for smart
meter authentication are investigated. The project identifies the
specific challenges associated with Smart Grid cybersecurity risk
assessment that provides a deeper understanding of cyber-
physical nature and risks related to the interconnection
between legacy systems and Smart Grid systems. Although the
cyber hygiene politics and approaches are out of the scope of this
project, there are some results relevant to this topic. For example,
in the publication on Social Engineering Attacks and the Smart
Grid (The SPARKS Project, 2015), it was outlined that many
organizations are focused on education as the core component of
user awareness in the area of social engineering attacks. It was also
noted that “analytics-based approach” or “intelligence-driven
security” should be adopted by organizations to respond to
such attacks.
UMBRELLA, Toolbox for Common Forecasting, Risk
assessment, and Operational Optimization in Grid Security
Cooperations project (2012–2015) FP7-ENERGY—Specific
Program “Cooperation”: Energy, is targeted toward the
development of the toolbox that enables Transmission System
Operators (TSOs) to ensure secure grid operation and innovative
power flow management in future electricity systems with
substantial contributions from intermittent renewable energy
sources (RESs). The UMBRELLA team delivered a set of
recommendations for relevant stakeholders. These proposals
help enhance interoperability and security in the pan-
European grid system and enable data exchange so that
developed software tools can be applied by TSOs and within
Regional Security Cooperation Initiatives (RSCIs).
SEGRID, Security for smart Electricity GRIDs project
(2014–2017) FP7-ENERGY—Specific Program “Cooperation”:
Energy, was targeted toward defending Smart Grids against
cyberattacks through six actions: 1) threats identification; 2)
security standards gap analysis for Smart Grids; 3)
development of new security approaches for ensuring privacy
and Smart Grids system security; 4) elaboration of Security
Integration Test Environment (SITE) to test and verify the
new security approaches; 5) evaluation and improvement of
risk management methodologies in terms of tailoring them to
the Smart Grids; 6) implementing obtained results into European
standardization bodies and Smart Grid industrial providers.
SUCCESS, SecUring CritiCal Energy infraStructureS project
(2016–2018), https://www.success-energy.eu/, aimed at
developing a comprehensive approach to threat analysis with
special focus on the Smart Meters (SM) vulnerabilities. Being one
of the core components of Smart Grid, SM need to be considered
from a security requirement perspective. For this purpose,
SUCCESS developed a set of concrete guidelines to support
the design of energy systems and their linked communications
networks.
DREAM-GO, enabling Demand Response for short and real-
time Efficient And Market based smart Grid Operation project
(2015–2019), http://dream-go.ipp.pt/, is targeted toward the
Smart Grids consumption flexibility and positioning the
consumer as an active player. The central role of the
consumer in this project enables developing and implementing
a set of consumer remuneration strategies allowing the key
players to interact with each other.
CIPSEC, enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection with
innovative SECurity framework project (2016–2019), https://
www.cipsec.eu/, developed a unified security framework and
ecosystem for cybersecurity protection of critical infrastructure
(CI) in particular at IT (information technology) and OT
(operational technology) departments. The project offered a
set of additional services such as forensics analysis of public-
private partnerships, vulnerability tests, security
recommendations, standardization and protection against
cascading effects, and training courses for the CI key personnel.
PROTECTIVE, Proactive Risk Management through
Improved Cyber Situational Awareness project (2016–2019),
https://protective-h2020.eu/, developed a comprehensive
solution to raise organizational cyber situational awareness. It
is performed by enhancing security alert correlation and
prioritization, linking the relevance/criticality of an
organization’s assets to its business/mission, and establishing a
TI sharing community.
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Cybersecurity and Cyber Hygiene Maturity
Models
Cybersecurity maturity model certification is a trend that is going
on, followed by industrial enterprises, that enables bolstering
security through enhanced visibility and improved defending
practices.
The Internet of Things Security Maturity Model: The
Industrial Internet Consortium®
The Industrial Internet Consortium® (IIC™) proposes a Security
Maturity Model (SMM) for the IoT providers, providing them
with a roadmap to gain a certain level of security according to the
requirements and eliminating overinvesting in unnecessary
security mechanisms (Bertino and Islam, 2017; Industrial
Internet Consortium, 2018). As mentioned in the (ENISA
Europa EU, 2017b, Cyber Hygiene) report, “the maturity model
is based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act (P-D-C-A) cycle (Act, in this
case, means accepting a new baseline if the check on the result
of the improvement step is successful).” The P-D-C-A cycle
begins by establishing the security maturity goal for the
targeting system. The next steps involve an iterative process
directed on the improvement of the security maturity, as
shown in Figure 1 (ENISA Europa EU, 2017b, Cyber Hygiene).
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification by NIST SP
800-171
The CMMC (Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification,
2020) is a unified cybersecurity standard for future DoD
acquisitions. We include cybersecurity maturity model
certification in this review since it is one of the essential
tools that the United States Government applies to audit
contractor compliance with NIST SP 800-171. This
procedure shows the level of adoption of the standards and
indicates the set of requirements an organization faces
throughout all levels from Level 1 up to Level 5 (Figure 2).
The CMMC framework lists the most common practices and
processes mapped through 17 maturity capability domains.
The following standards are mapped in the CMMC: ISO
27002, NIST Cybersecurity Framework (2020), NIST 800-171
rev2, NIST 800-171B, NIST 800-53 rev4, FAR 52.204-21, CERT
RMM v1.2, CIS (2019) Critical Security Controls v7.1, and Secure
Controls Framework (SCF) and other control frameworks.
FIGURE 1 | SMM improvement cycle (ENISA, cyber hygiene).
FIGURE 2 | CMMC maturity process progression (CMMC, 2020).
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Awareness & Training Maturity Capability (AT-MC) includes
CERT RMM v1.2 and SCF: (i) establish a policy that includes
Awareness & Training (AT); (ii) document the CMMC practices
needed to apply the AT policy; (iii) setup, realize, and supply the
AT plan; (iv) inspect and measure the efficiency of AT activities;
(v) standardize and optimize a documented approach for AT
within all organization.
The ATmust include CERT RMMv1.2, CIS v7.1, NIST 800-53
rev4, NIST 800-171 rev2, ISO 27002, NIST CSF, and SCF: (i)
ensure that all those concerned (managers, system
administrators, and end-users) are made aware of the security
risks associated with their activities and of the applicable policies,
standards, and procedures related to the security of those systems;
(ii) produce ad hoc security training on how to recognize the
insider threats and how to report them; (iii) provide awareness
training focused on how to recognize and respond to the social
engineering incidents, security breaches, different types of
suspicious behaviors, and advanced persistent threat actors;
(iv) have practical exercises in cybersecurity awareness training
tailored to the current threat scenarios; (v) evaluate the level of
awareness of personnel to be sure that people are able to carry out
assigned information security-related duties and responsibilities.
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification by SEI
The CMMC for Information Technology Services (C2M2 for IT
Services, 2015) by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) is
developed based on the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model
(C2M2, U.S. Department of Energy, 2014a; U.S. Department of
Energy, 2014b) and the Electricity Subsector C2M2 (ES-C2M2,
2014). The model enables evaluating the level of adoption of
cybersecurity practices on typical enterprise IT services.
Organizations can use C2M2 as a self-evaluation methodology
to measure their cybersecurity program and improve it. The
model covers 10 domains (see Figure 3). Each domain includes a
set of cybersecurity practices grouped by objective, e.g., risk
management, threat and vulnerability management, and
configuration management. These practices are ordered within
each objective and vary by maturity indicator level (MIL)
(CMMC, v01, 2020).
The newest version of the model (Cybersecurity Capability
Maturity Model Version 2.0, June 2019) suggests four maturity
levels from MIL0, where practices are not performed, to MIL3,
where objectives and practices are established and monitored.
Summary on Standards and Best Practices
As mentioned in ENISA’s review of CH practices (ENISA Europa
EU, 2017b, Cyber Hygiene), to this moment, every EU Member
State has its own CH programs or guidance. Most of these
programs are aligned with, or driven by, the National Cyber
Security Strategies (ENISA Europa EU, 2017a, National
Cybersecurity Strategies—Interactive Map) and are at varying
levels of maturity. Some of the predominant ones are the Belgian
Cybersecurity guide, which also provides an assessment
questionnaire for businesses, the “40 Essential Measures for a
Healthy Network” report produced by ANSSI and the “Cyber
Essentials Guidance” of the United Kingdom government.
Furthermore, the approval of the European NIS Directive and
the creation of the Cybersecurity Competence Center Network in
Europe are paving the way toward a homogeneous CH strategy
across Europe.
Summarizing existing general CHmodules and education, our
analysis revealed that most of the previous projects tend to raise
organizational cyber situational awareness in Smart Grids; many
of them have contributed heavily in cybersecurity while
comprehensive strategy and methodological approach for
evaluating CH maturity level have not been developed yet.
There are several European initiatives targeted at producing
CH frameworks on a wide-scale basis. For stepping up the
practical activities to this end and making them more specific
to the energy sector, electricity and Smart Grids equipment is
badly needed. As a result, we conclude that, aside from the
cybersecurity tools development, it is necessary to promote a
FIGURE 3 | C2M2 for IT services model architecture (C2M2, v1.0, 2015).
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holistic approach to CH management with the ultimate goal of
cultivating a strong cybersecurity culture in Smart Grids and best
practices adoption. The CH management shall be pivoted by (i)
CHMM to enable the assessment of the cybersecurity posture of
the organization; (ii) increasing training dynamics and awareness
methods for Smart Grid cybersecurity; (iii) continuous enhancing
cybersecurity skills.
The growing complexity of the Smart Grid infrastructure, their
security components and tools used for cyberattack detection,
mitigation, and information sharing such as Security Incident and
Event Management (SIEM) systems, AMI Honeypots, forensics
tools, and anonymous repositories of incidents open new
horizons for the incorporation of CH practices in utilities
where they have not been used before. Our analysis shows
that existent cybersecurity and cyber hygiene maturity models
cover common CH practices and allow us to measure the general
maturity level but do not take into account the level of adoption of
core cybersecurity components used by Smart Grids
organizations for (i) detection (e.g., SPEAR SIEM); (ii)
forensics (e.g., SPEAR FRF); (iii) information sharing (e.g.,
SPEAR RI) in the Smart Grid protection cycle.
To be in compliance with the CH rules related to the Smart
Grids, we deliver a cyber hygiene maturity assessment framework
tailored to the Smart Grid protection cycle by extending general
CH frameworks with Smart Grid infrastructure indicators, which
is both maintainable and upgradable in terms of adoption for the
Smart Grids cybersecurity components. Special components in
the section of people indicators (awareness, education, and
training) are also introduced. Therefore, the proposed
extension goes one step further by focusing on CH in the
Smart Grid.
RESULTS
A cyber hygiene maturity model (CHMM) is a benchmark that
customers can use to assess a Smart Grid cybersecurity practices
landscape, whether in relation to people, process, technology, or
all three.
The CHMM enables performing CH maturity assessment and
identifying gaps between the current and future state. SPEAR
promotes the use of the Smart Grid CHMM to help end-users
(Smart Grid operator organizations) understand quantitatively
where they are (an as-is state) in terms of cyber hygiene posture
and, based on their mission and goals, where they want to be (a
to-be state).
The CHMM gets relevance as a tool to aid the organizations
in measuring the progress on the adoption of best practices and
technologies supporting prevention, detection, and reaction
against cyber threats in their systems. The specificities of the
SPEAR CHMM reside in the fact that it is tailored to the needs
of Smart Grids systems and organizations operating them and
in the fact that it fully aligns with SPEAR solution
methodologies (e.g., SPEAR Forensics Framework) and tools
(e.g., SPEAR SIEM) to support some of the CH best practices
and recommendations promoted in the model. A maturity
assessment provides an indication of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats.
The target audience for the CHMM includes Smart Grid
infrastructure or service operator organizations, policymakers,
system integrators, cybersecurity and information security
specialists, architects, security assessors, regulatory authorities,
analysts, and other stakeholders involved in the processes of the
development and implementation of mature security of the
specific Smart Grid system.
Adoption of P-D-C-A Cycle in the SPEAR
CHMM
As was shown in previous sections, all maturitymodels are based on
the Plan-Do-Check-Act (P-D-C-A) cycle. The levels of the CHL
should include the check items about whether these activities (steps)
are following P-D-C-A: defining requirements/plan with objects;
carrying the action accordingly; checking whether the implemented
actions are working well; acting to correct any deviations toward
actually fulfilling the objectives. The basic level includes P & D
detection; advanced: P-D-C—Detection & Forensics (P, D) and
information sharing; highest: advanced P-D-C-A (continuous
improvement) —Detection, Forensics, information sharing.
As was shown in previous sections, all maturity models are
based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act (P-D-C-A) cycle. The levels
of the CHL should include the check items about whether these
activities (steps) are following the P-D-C-A approach. Here, P
stands for “requirements or plan defined with objectives,” D
stands for “do or carry out the actions according to the plan,” C
stands for “check whether the implemented actions are
working well,” and A indicates “act to correct any
deviations toward actually fulfilling the objectives.” The
CHMM suggests that while organizations in basic cyber
hygiene levels usually only perform P and D activities, they
progressively improve in cybersecurity and perform quality
checks (C activities) in relation to adopted practices and
finally, they are able to follow a continuous improvement
approach with A type of activities. In general, organizations
in basic CHLs only carry out basic cyber awareness and cyber
incident detection practices, while advanced levels correspond
to organizations that, besides detection, perform more
sophisticated activities such as cyber incident forensics and
information sharing. At the highest CHL, we could find
organizations that perform all cybersecurity practices in a
proactive way, establishing objectives for all of them,
continuously assessing their effectiveness, and correcting
any digression.
This approach is aligned with the lifecycle of an organization’s
cybersecurity risk management described in the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) (NIST Cybersecurity
Framework, 2020). Accordingly, it can be easily adopted for
Smart Grid CH enabling the progressive adoption of best
practices and solutions on different steps in the protection of
the Smart Grid system, which are organized by the NIST
Cybersecurity framework (2020) in these functions:
IDENTIFY-PROTECT-DETECT-RESPOND-RECOVER.
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Applying a Plan-Do-Check-Act approach in each of the levels
of the SPEARCHMM (seeTable 1), we can leverage the following
procedures supported by SPEAR methods and tools: detection
(using SPEAR SIEM), forensics (using SPEAR FRF), and
information sharing (SPEAR RI) in the Smart Grid protection
cycle (Figure 4).
Description of the SPEAR CH Maturity
Model
General Structure of the Model
The SPEAR CHMM framework organizes processes and cyber
hygiene best practices into three main domains or dimensions of
the model: people, organization, and infrastructure. The
aggregation of the levels assessed in these domains through
the correspondent metrics evaluates the overall maturity level
achieved by the organization. The 3×3 domains of the SPEAR
CHMM (Figure 6) correspond to the following base components
of the Smart Grid assessment: (i) Smart Grid infrastructure: in
this dimension, the maturity of adopted cybersecurity measures
to protect the infrastructure is assessed (e.g., SPEAR tools); (ii)
organization: this dimension corresponds to the maturity of the
organizational processes (policies, standards, etc.); (iii) people
dimension representing the human factor (end-users, operators,
and personal of Smart Grids): in this dimension, awareness and
training maturity are the main factors of security practices
adoption.
SPEAR CHMM consists of five maturity levels (Figure 6)
ranging from Level 1, Basic, to Level 5, Proactive. Each maturity
level is associated with a set of sustainable processes and practices.
Practices vary from Level 1, where basic reactive cybersecurity
measures (e.g., incident response plan) are developed and step-
by-step enhanced, to Level 5, where proactive security is
implemented. Respectively, processes could be defined from
being introduced at Level 1, properly documented at Level 2,
up to being spread across the Smart Grid organization at Level 5.
To comply with specific requirements and reach the particular
CHL, a Smart Grid organization should implement and
completely adopt the processes and practices within the
targeted level and below.
The description of the main objectives in each level is
summarized as follows.
Infrastructure (Technical Practices)
Level 1: Demonstrate basic CH.
Level 2: Demonstrate intermediate CH + Level 1.
Level 3: Demonstrate good CH and effective security
requirements + Level 2.
Level 4: Demonstrate substantial and proactive cybersecurity +
Level 3.
FIGURE 4 | SPEAR CH improvement cycles.
TABLE 1 | Plan-Do-Check-Act coverage of the SPEAR tools on each CHL of the SPEAR CHMM.
P-D-C-A SPEAR tools Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Plan + + + + +
Detection and situational awareness about cyberattacks SPEAR SIEM + + + +
Forensics SPEAR FRF + + +
Information sharing SPEAR RI + +
Continuous improvements SIEM+FEF+RI +
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Level 5: Demonstrate the ability of Smart Grid infrastructure to
continually evolve to meet cybersecurity threats and repel
advanced invasions + Level 4.
Organization (Process Maturity)
Level 1: There is no process maturity.
Level 2: Establish a policy that includes Awareness & Training
(AT). Standard operating procedures, policies, and plans are
established for all practices.
Level 3: Activities are defined as a standard across the
organization. The AT program is actively reviewed for and
updated on an annual basis + Level 2.
Level 4: A CH process is tailored for specific departments
within the Smart Grid organization. The AT program includes
different target groups that have unique training requirements,
including skills-based training for IT-department and developer
groups. The AT program is actively reviewed and updated on a
monthly basis + Level 3.
Level 5: A documented approach for the AT across all Smart
Grid units is standardized and optimized across the organization.
Activities are identified and improvements are shared + Level 4.
People (Awareness, Education, and Training)
Level 1: Ensure that operators and end-users are made aware of
the security risks associated with their activities and of the
applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the
security of Smart Grid systems.
Level 2: Document practices to implement the AT. Operators
pass security awareness training periodically on recognizing and
reporting potential insider threats and using SPEAR SIEM tools +
Level 1.
Level 3: Establish, maintain, and resource a plan that includes
the AT. A set of training topics focused on general principles of
CH in Smart Grid, phishing, social engineering, advanced
persistent threat actors, suspicious behaviors, and using
SPEAR FRF tool (including demonstrations) is deployed and
conducted on a periodic basis. Operators and end-users
demonstrate awareness of security risks associated with their
activities and of the applicable policies, standards, and
procedures related to the Smart Grid security. Smart Grid
security team demonstrates awareness of using SPEAR FRF
tool + Level 2.
Level 4: Review and measure the AT activities for
effectiveness. Training topics include practical exercises in
awareness training aligned with current Smart Grid threat
scenarios and provide feedback to individuals involved in
training and information sharing via SPEAR RI or other
SIEM. Department leads and teams request security
reviews/audits. Smart Grid security team demonstrates
awareness of using SPEAR RI tool + Level 3.
Level 5: The AT is updated at least annually or in case of
significant changes to the threat. The leadership actively requests
and utilizes security awareness metrics to measure their
organizational progress/compare departments across the
organization + Level 4.
FIGURE 6 | Five levels of cyber hygiene maturity model.
FIGURE 5 | SPEAR cyber hygiene maturity model.
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CH Maturity Levels
Level 1: Basic. This level is considered as basic cyber hygiene
and includes a set of cyber protective, defense-related
measures. The practices on this level are seen as laying the
basis for the higher levels.
Smart Grid Infrastructure indicators: There is no monitoring and
sharing data. SPEAR tools have not been adopted.
Organization indicators: There is no security awareness
program. No standards are in place and inconsistency exists
across the organization.
People indicators: Operators and end-users declare that they
aware of security risks associated with their activities and
accepted policies and procedures related to the security of
Smart Grid systems.
Metrics: none.
Steps to the next level: 1) Identify the set of applicable
regulations and standards. 2) Identify the security awareness
training requirements. 3) Identify someone to roll out the
required security awareness training. 4) Develop or take the
AT that satisfies those requirements. 5) Make use of security
awareness training. 6) Track and document all participants who
complete the training.
Level 2: Intermediate
Level 2 is seen as intermediate CH, offering continuous
maturing of Smart Grid organization from Level 1 to Level
3. Compared to Level 1, this includes more advanced policies
that enable the increase of the resilience of Smart Grids to
cyber threats. Being at this level, a Smart Grid organization
defines, documents, and maintains their information security
program and clarifies road map and strategic plans to guide
the procedures for protecting their assets, systems, and data,
at a level greater than the baseline requirements. The AT
program is established to meet specific objectives or comply
with the audit requirements. In most scenarios, training is
conducted on an annual basis. The staff is aware of the CH
practices, but in many cases, people are unconfident of the
organizational policies and their role in cyber accident
prevention.
Smart Grid Infrastructure indicators: SPEAR SIEM tools are
adopted and used periodically: I.2.01, the tool(s) that monitor
traffic data have been installed; I.2.02, the tool(s) that monitor
device logs have been installed; I.2.11, monitoring of traffic data
done periodically (at least once a month); I.2.22, monitoring of
devices logs done periodically (at least once a month).
Organization indicators: O.2.01, a policy that includes
Awareness & Training (AT) is established but not
documented; O.2.02, incident response plan exists, but there
is no strategic plan and training topics are ad hoc and deployed
at random times; O.2.03, the AT program has been established.
(4) Organization has limited leadership support. Leadership’s
goal is to invest the minimum resources. (5) Security
awareness is only considered during audits. (6) There is
little involvement from other departments, such as
communications and human resources. (7) Leadership
believes that security is purely a technical issue. (8)
Training is primarily once a year. (9) Training is limited to
computer-based training, with perhaps some occasional
support materials during the year.
People indicators: P.2.01, operators and end-users aware of the
cybersecurity risks associated with the working activities are
familiar with the accepted standards, policies, and procedures;
P.2.02, operators pass security awareness training to recognize
and report about potential insider threat, as well as on using
SPEAR SIEM tools; P.2.12, there is a set of on-time ad hoc
training topics deployed once a year; P.2.22, operators pass
computer-based training periodically, with support materials
during the year. End-users feel security is something that IT
takes care of and that it is not their problem.
Metrics: (1) Number / % of people that have completed
training. (2) Number / % of people that have signed
Acceptable Use Policy. (3) Number of on-site training sessions
in one year. (4) Number/frequency of awareness materials
distributed (newsletters, posters, etc.).
Steps to the next level: 1) Identify stakeholders. 2) Create a CH
awareness program and identify scope, goals, objectives,
assumptions, and constraints. 3) Identify who will be
responsible for the awareness program. A person should be
dedicated full-time and have a soft skills background to
ensure the greatest success. 4) Create Advisory Board. 5)
Identify the target group for the CHL program, starting
with a baseline for all employees. 6) Identify what human
risks should be managed and the behaviors that will mitigate
those risks. 7) Identify how to include cultural analysis,
primary training, and reinforcement training. 8) Develop or
purchase training materials. 9) Create an execution plan with
milestones to include metrics. 10) Have senior leadership
announce the plan and execute it.
Level 3: Good Cyber Hygiene
Level 3 involves a certain amount of expertise in protecting and
sustaining the main assets of Smart Grid organization. An
organization assessed at Level 3 CHMM demonstrates good
cyber hygiene and effective implementation of security
controls. However, it may face a range of challenges related
to eliminating advanced persistent threats (APT). It is
expected that for the maturity of the processes, the Smart
Grid organization will adequately tap resources and verify
compliance with policies and procedures, demonstrating
good practices in managing cybersecurity and CH. The AT
program is targeted at the most important user groups and
learning topics that focus on these key elements of
cybersecurity and ensure effective implementation of the
organization’s mission. The program is regularly updated
and includes ongoing reinforcement throughout the year.
As a result, people have good understanding of the policies
of their organization and are able to recognize, prevent, and
report incidents.
Smart Grid Infrastructure indicators: SPEAR SIEM and
SPEAR FRF tools are adopted. Metrics describe the level of
adoption of SPEAR instruments in Smart Grids: I.3.11,
monitoring traffic data is done continuously (at least once a
week); I.3.22, monitoring device logs is done continuously (at
least once a week); I.3.03, the tool(s) for anomaly detection have
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been installed. I.3.13, the tool(s) for anomaly detection are used
periodically (at least once a month). Application stability and
performance are continuously monitored.
Organization indicators: O.3.01, a policy that includes the AT
is fully documented; O.3.02, an incident response plan is fully
documented and includes strategic plan and schedule of
trainings; O.3.03, a strategic plan that has identified the scope,
goals, objectives, and justification for the AT is documented;
O.3.05, data back-up policy has been established; O.3.33,
organization has clearly defined target groups, usually based
on roles/risks but can also be defined by language, region, or
other drivers; O.3.43, top human risks, actions, and behaviors that
enable sufficiently managing those risks have been identified and
explained; O.3.13, the AT program coordinates and collaborates
with various departments within the organization, including
Communications, Human Resources, and Help Desk; O.3.04,
the AT program is actively reviewed and updated on an annual
basis; O.3.23, a CH process is defined as a standard across the
organization; O.3.14, the AT program includes continuous
reinforcement throughout the year.
People indicators: P.3.03, there is an AT program lead who
is working on a full-time basis and is responsible for the
development, implementation, and updating the AT
program. P.3.02, training topics are focused on general
principles of CH in Smart Grid, phishing, social
engineering, advanced persistent threat actors, suspicious
behaviors and using SPEAR FRF tool (including
demonstrations) and deployed on a periodic basis. P.3.01,
operators and end-users demonstrate awareness of
cybersecurity risks related to their activities as well as
accepted standards, policies, and procedures. P.3.11, Smart
Grid security team demonstrates awareness of using SPEAR
FRF tool. P.3.05, training topics include real-life examples and
exercises in awareness training aligned with actual threat
scenarios, provide information sharing via SPEAR RI, and
track the progress of people involved in training. (6) People are
reporting incidents or suspected attacks. (7) When the security
team pushes out information, people are asking them
questions. (8) Employees are exhibiting the behaviors they
are being trained on. (9) Employees bring strong security
behaviors at home.
Metrics: (1) Phishing assessments. (2) Number of infected
computers/devices each month. (3) Number of lost or stolen
computers/devices each month. (4) Number of security policy
violations.
Steps to the next level: 1) Establish a process to give
leadership regular updates on an awareness program. 2)
Identify the technological changes, new threats, variations
in business requirements, or standards and include all of
them in an annual report. 3) Take a poll to determine the
current state of awareness and associated behaviors. 4)
Schedule a specific date when the security program is
reviewed every year and who, what, and how questions are
updated by the Advisory Board. 5) Expand modalities to scale
and engage the workforce. Examples include gamification and
OSINT briefs for senior executives.
Level 4: Advanced
At CH assessment model Level 4, a Smart Grid organization is
characterized by substantial and proactive cybersecurity. This
means a high level of adaptation of their protection and
sustainment activities to the changing methods, techniques,
and procedures in use by APT. For process maturity, it is
expected that Smart Grid organization reviews and documents
all activities related to cybersecurity and timely informs upper
executive management about any issues or cyber incidents.
The AT program is equipped with all necessary resources and
updated at least on an annual basis. As a result, the program
becomes a part of internal culture and is relevant, engaging,
and up-to-date. The AT program keeps beyond changing
behavior and supports people’s beliefs, attitudes, and
perceptions of security. At a minimum, it takes 3–10 years
to achieve this level.
Smart Grid Infrastructure indicators: SPEAR SIEM, SPEAR
FRF, and SPEAR RI tools are adopted. I.4.1, monitoring of
traffic data is done continuously. I.4.2, monitoring of devices
logs is done continuously. I.4.3, forensics is done on anomalies
detected. I.4.23, the tool(s) for anomaly detection are used
continuously (at least once a week). I.4.04, the tool(s) for
information sharing (e.g., SPEAR RI) have been installed.
I.4.14, the tools for information sharing are used for
sharing information between Smart Grid organizations
periodically (at least once a month).
Organization indicators: O.4.23, a CH process is tailored for
specific departments. O.4.04, the AT program is actively reviewed
and updated on amonthly basis. O.4.13, the AT program includes
identified multiple different target groups that have unique
training requirements, including skills-based training for IT-
department groups and developer groups. O.4.14, reviewing
and measuring AT activities for effectiveness are performed on
a monthly basis.
People indicators: P.4.02, Smart Grid security team
demonstrates awareness of using SPEAR RI tool. P.4.03,
department leads and teams request security reviews/audits.
(3) Program lead is actively updating leadership on a monthly
basis. (4) Security team believes in investing in human controls
just as much as technical controls. There is strong integration
between awareness and technical practice. Good security
practices are “baked in” who we are and what we do. (5)
Employees educate others on good security behaviors. (6)
Employees start providing ideas or suggestions on how to
improve security in the organization. (7) Employees or
departments request security briefings/updates; they are
actively seeking more information. (8) Department leads and
teams request security reviews/audits. (9) Departments beg to
compete/compare who has the best security.
Metrics: (1) Number of events analyzed by SPEAR SIEM. (2)
Survey measuring people’s attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs
toward information security and number of people/
departments requesting security briefings or updates. (3)
Number of people submitting ideas on how to improve
security. (4) Number of people attending optional events. (5)
Number of requests on how a family can take the training.
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Steps to the next level: 1) Create a metrics dashboard that
combines all the information/measurements from the different
maturity levels. 2) Tie in metrics to technical security metrics and
ultimately Smart Grid overall mission.
Level 5: Proactive
At CH assessment model Level 5, a Smart Grid organization has
advanced cybersecurity. The organization is capable of adapting
its protection activities, changing tactics, updating techniques,
and enhancing procedures to have strength against APT. In terms
of process maturity, it is expected that the Smart Grid
organization reviews and documents all activities related to
high-level security management and implementation. The AT
program has a robust metrics framework aligned with the
organization’s mission to track progress and measure impact.
The AT program is continuously improving and able to
demonstrate return on investment.
This level assumes that SPEAR SIEM, SPEAR FRF, and
SPEAR RI tools are completely adopted and periodically updated.
Smart Grid Infrastructure indicators: I.5.24, the tool(s) for
information sharing are used continuously (at least once a week).
I.5.4, there is information sharing between SG organizations.
Organization indicators: O.5.13, a documented approach for
AT across all SG units has been standardized and optimized
across the organization (on an annual basis). (2) The process is
continuously improved.
People indicators: P.5.02, the training is updated regularly
(annually or in case of significant changes to the threat).
P.5.03, leadership actively requests and uses security awareness
metrics to measure their organizational progress/compare
departments across the organization.
Metrics: All the above is combined into a single dashboard
interface or some type of centralizing capability that can be
visualized and easily reported to business partners. Strategic
metrics include the following: (i) number of incidents, (ii)
time to detect an incident, and (iii) time to recover from an
incident.
Security capabilities metrics can be used to effectively and
consistently measure the current CH maturity via information
gathering and reporting and compatible testing and evaluate
procedures that enable Smart Grids organizations to clearly
identify improvement points in order to reach higher maturity
levels.
CH Maturity Level Assessment
The CHL maturity assessment procedure usually starts by
creating an assessment plan. Then, the assessors collect all
the necessary evidence, calculate the maturity levels, and
generate the report that details the findings and CH
maturity levels for each of the three domains in the CHMM
model. Based on the assessment results, the Smart Grid
organization can plan the necessary improvements to reach
a new maturity level target.
DISCUSSION
The SPEAR Cyber Hygiene Maturity Assessment Framework
(CHMF) addresses two major goals in the cyber hygiene
playground. Firstly, it enables awareness and adoption of
fundamental cyber hygiene practices for Smart Grids and
secondly, it guides the Smart Grid operator organizations in the
path to progressively adopt measures to boost their overall
cybersecurity posture and achieve high CHL with respect to
cybersecurity, privacy, and data protection issues. The structure
of the model adopted for the SPEAR CHMM is inspired from
DoDCybersecurityMaturityModel Certification (CMMC) v1.02 (of
March 18, 2020). The SPEARCHMM is tailored to evaluate the level
of cyber hygiene in Smart Grid organizations since it captures Smart
Grid infrastructure and operator organization dimension related
cybersecurity practices and aligns with the Smart Grid cybersecurity
tools proposed by the SPEAR project. Furthermore, the SPEAR
CHMM aims at assuring cyber awareness and readiness of Smart
Grid personnel and customers to different cyber threats and
cyberattack incidents. To enable the quantitative assessment of
the practices associated with each of the CHL, we developed a
questionnaire where most of the questions need to be answered
with a Yes/No type of responses. The SPEAR CHMM auditor
(who could be internal or external staff of the Smart Grid
operator organization) would assess the maturity level by
making questions oriented to cybersecurity responsible
personnel to measure Yes/No availability of practices proposed
by the CHMM and in case the practice is measurable, evaluate the
metrics of indicator. The final result of the assessment would
therefore be the identification of the CHL of the organization,
with the results of the values of the metrics measured for each of
the practices, and then a report on the recommended activities to
carry out or adopt in the organization to progress to the next
maturity level so that the organization can increase cyber
protection and preparedness against cyber incidents or attacks
ENISA Europa EU, 2009.
The SPEAR CHMF enables verifying whether a Smart Grid
organization matches the requirements to reach a certain cyber
hygiene maturity level and due to a simplified information
collection, it can be used to automate CH maturity assessment.
The assessment also emphasizes the level of adoption of standards
and best practices in CH for each control area and its effectiveness
and maturity of internal policies and procedures. As in many risk
assessment approaches [The Department of Defense (DoD), 2020;
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC), 2020; U.S.
Department of Defense, 2020], assessors in SPEAR CHMF
typically evaluate indicators based on whether they are in place
or implemented, resulting in a binary Yes/No and compliance-
oriented manner.
All of these results have been validated by SPEAR end-users
and are currently being reviewed by Smart Grid stakeholders
outside the SPEAR Consortium. The methodology and outcome
of these evaluations are planned for publication in the near future.
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CONCLUSION
This work explains the support offered in SPEAR to improve the
CH practices in organizations operating Smart Grids in Europe.
We reviewed the CH needs and challenges in the Smart Grid
domain and analyzed the state of the art in best practices and
standards around cybersecurity and CH in the energy domain.
The proposed CHMF integrates the best practices in Smart Grid
cybersecurity and cyber hygiene and proposes to organizations a
well-organized and structured adoption of cyber practices to
increase cybersecurity capabilities. The CHF includes trainings,
the CHMM, and a comprehensive approach to measure the
progress of capability improvement in Smart Grid organizations
according to the levels defined in the CHMM.
The SPEAR CHMM organizes the progress in cyber hygiene
capabilities improvement in five levels as described above. The
approach proposed is a P-D-C-A cycle where the organizations
improve their cybersecurity capabilities in three different
dimensions: organization, infrastructure (corresponding to the
Smart Grid), and people (organization staff). The CHMM explains
the improvement and support that SPEAR tools offer to the different
activities proposed in the capability enhancement process.
All the materials provided, including the CHMM and its
assessment methodology, have been designed according to the
needs, ideas, and suggestions from SPEAR end-users collected
through dedicated questionnaires developed in the project as well.
Considering the scope of the CHMM, it is delivered with the
following training modules: (i) Cybersecurity awareness for electricity
organizations: Smart Grid cyber risks and general cybersecurity rules;
(ii) cybersecurity awareness for electricity consumers:
recommendations to protect their privacy and basic security rules;
(iii) SPEAR SIEM for Smart Grid operators; (iv) SPEAR Forensics
[SPEAR Forensics framework; SPEAR AMI Honeypots (RTU
honeypots, Smart meter honeypots, etc.)]; SPEAR Information
Sharing (SPEAR RI: Anonymous Repository of Incidents).
Supplementary materials present the summary of the
assessment items evaluated by the SPEAR CHMF proposed.
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